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ON MINIMUM INTEGER REPRESENTATIONS OF WEIGHTED GAMES
JOSEP FREIXASA AND SASCHA KURZB
Abstract: We study minimum integer representations of weighted games, i.e. representations where the
weights are integers and every other integer representation is at least as large in each component. Those
minimum integer representations, if the exist at all, are linked with some solution concepts in game theory.
Closing existing gaps in the literature, we prove that each weighted game with two types of voters admits
a (unique) minimum integer representation, and give new examples for more than two types of voters
without a minimum integer representation. We characterize the possible weights in minimum integer
representations and give examples for t ≥ 4 types of voters without a minimum integer representation
preserving types, i.e. where we additionally require that the weights are equal within equivalence classes.
Keywords: weighted games, minimum integer representations, representations with minimum sum.
MSC: 91B12?, 91A12, 90C10.
1. INTRODUCTION
Simple games, or positive switching functions, can be viewed as models of voting systems in
which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo.
Weighted games, or positive threshold functions, are possibly the most interesting subclass of
simple games. Roughly speaking, in a weighted game a non-negative weight wi is assigned to
each voter 1 ≤ i ≤ n and a quota q is specified. As an abbreviation for a weighted game we use
the notation [q;w1, . . . , wn]. Winning coalitions are those that can force a victory, i.e. the sum of
their weights equals or surpasses the quota. Weighted games naturally appear in several different
contexts apart from voting, like reliability analysis of technical systems (see Ramamurthy [27])
or neural networks (see, among others, Elgot [7] or Freixas and Molinero [9]).
The number of simple games on a fixed set N = {1, . . . , n} is finite, of course, but it grows
very rapidly with an increasing number of voters n since we are dealing with sets of sets. Indeed,
every family of pairwise independent subsets ofN can serve as the set of minimal winning coali-
tions defining a simple game. Two subsets are independent if neither contains the other. Families
of independent subsets are sometimes called “Sperner families“, “coherent systems“, or “clut-
ters“, and their enumeration and classification have occupied mathematicians since Dedekind in
the 19th century. In his 1897 work he determined the exact number of simple games with four
or fewer players. Since that time simple games have been investigated in a variety of different
mathematical contexts. An account of some of these works can be found in: Sperner [29], Isbell
[14], Golomb [13], Muroga et al. [23, 24], Shapley and Shubik [28], Dubey and Shapley [4],
Kurz and Tautenhahn [19, 20], Freixas and Molinero [10, 11], Krohn and Sudho¨lter [18], Keijzer
et al. [16, 17]. Although the number of weighted games compared with the number of simple
games is small, it grows very rapidly and there do not exist enumeration results for more than
nine voters.
Integer representations, i.e. where the weights wi and the quota q are non-negative integers,
are very common in practice and minimum integer representations, if they exist, constitute the
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most efficient way to represent weighted games. Several algorithms to compute certain power
indices require integer weights and benefit from weights of small magnitude. When considering
e.g. shareholders of a firm, integer weights, i.e. the number of (equal) shares, arise naturally.
Geometrically, the set of equivalent integer representations of a weighted game is an unbounded
cone with or without a vertex. Hence, a natural question arises: For which weighted games does
a minimum integer representation exist? Or, in other words, for which weighted games does the
associated integer cone have a vertex? Symmetric games, i.e. games where all players have an
equivalent role in the game and, therefore, are characterized by one single type of equivalent
voters, admit a minimum integer representation. But it is known that there does not always exist
a minimum integer representation for a weighted game. Muroga et al. [23] in their exhaustive
enumeration of threshold functions (or, equivalently, weighted games) uncovered several cases
with as few as eight players in which two symmetric players must be given different weights in
a minimum sum integer representation; e.g. [12; 7, 6, 6, 4, 4, 4, 3, 2] = [12; 7, 6, 6, 4, 4, 4, 2, 3].
Here a minimum sum integer representation is an integer representation such that the sum of
weights
∑n
i=1wi is minimal. Moreover, they verified that all weighted games with less than
eight players admit a minimum integer representation. We can easily check that this example
consists of four types of players (a type here is an element of a partition of N formed by equiva-
lent voters), and each type contains players with the same weights except for the last type, which
contains players with weights 3 and 2.
To our knowledge it is not known whether there exist weighted games without a minimum
integer representation with either two or three types of players. The main goal of this paper is
to ascertain what occurs for these two cases, filling the existing gap in the theory of weighted
games. Previous to Muroga et al’s example, Isbell [14] had exhibited a remarkable 12-player
example in which the affected players are not symmetric. Thus, even if we additionally require
that all players of equal type have equal weights, the existence of a minimum integer representa-
tion preserving types is not guaranteed. Freixas and Molinero [10, 11] uncovered several cases
of weighted games without a minimum integer representation preserving types with as few as
9 players and checked the nonexistence of such examples for less than 9 players; see also [19].
All the examples they listed have at least 5 types of players. So quite naturally, we want to
ascertain what occurs for less than 5 types. We would like to remark that homogeneous games1
admit a minimum integer representation as shown by Ostmann [25].
A natural third issue emerges to be significant, whenever there does not exist a minimum
integer representation for a weighted game (either preserving types or not). In that situation
at least two integer representations are minimal, but is it possible to generate weighted games
with more than two minimal representations? Since integer representations which attain the
minimum possible sum of weights are minimal, we ask more generally for constructions of
weighted games with an arbitrary number of minimum sum integer representations. As far
as we know, all the previously published examples without a minimum integer representation
(either preserving types or not) have only two minimum sum integer representations. Additional
results, we introduce here, comprise: bounds on the number of non-isomorphic weighted games
as a function of the number of voters and the number of types of voters, and the existence of a
weighted game in minimum integer representation for any pair of two coprime integer weights.
1A weighted game is called homogeneous if it admits a representation where all minimal winning coalitions have
the same weight.
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Minimum integer representations of weighted games are important in game theory: Peleg [26]
proved that for homogeneous weighted decisive games the nucleolus (a well-known solution
concept in game theory) coincides with the minimum integer representation preserving types.
Also, in the cases where there is no minimum integer representation preserving types, there are
connections linking a minimum sum integer representation preserving types with the least core
(another solution concept) and the nucleolus of weighted decisive games [18].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we precisely define the
classes of complete simple games and weighted games. For complete simple games we state
a parameterization theorem by Carreras and Freixas in Subsection 2.1, which completely char-
acterizes these objects up to isomorphism using linear inequalities. The subclass of weighted
games can be defined via the non-emptiness of certain polytopes as outlined in Subsection 2.2.
The details on minimum integer representations are stated in Subsection 2.3. In Section 3 we
present constructions for weighted games without a minimum integer representation for small t
(Subsection 3.1) and for those with more than two minimum sum integer representations (Sub-
section 3.2). In Subsection 3.3 we study the question of which weights may occur in a minimum
integer representation. Our main theorem, that each weighted game with two types of voters ad-
mits a minimum integer representation, is given in Section 4. Implications for the enumeration
or bounds on the number of weighted games, which arise as a byproduct of our previous results,
are briefly stated in Section 5. We end with a conclusion in Section 6.
2. SIMPLE GAMES, COMPLETE SIMPLE GAMES AND WEIGHTED GAMES
From a more general point of view, binary voting systems, i.e. those where each voter has the
option to vote yes or no, which then is condensed by a certain voting rule, can be represented by
a characteristic function χ : 2N → {0, 1}, where N := {1, . . . , n} is the set of voters and 2N
denotes the set {U | U ⊆ N} of all subsets of N . A quite natural monotonicity assumption on
χ leads to a very prominent class of binary voting systems.
Definition 2.1. A simple game is a function χ : 2N → {0, 1}, which satisfies χ(∅) = 0,
χ(N) = 1, and χ(U ′) ≤ χ(U) for all U ′ ⊆ U ⊆ N , where N is a finite set.
So, if we identify 2N with {0, 1}n, each simple game is a monotone Boolean function and
except for the all-zero function and the all-one function all monotone Boolean functions are
simple games. We will call a subset U ⊆ N a coalition.
Definition 2.2. A coalition U ⊆ N of a simple game χ is called winning if χ(U) = 1 and losing
otherwise. A coalition U is called a minimal winning coalition if χ(U) = 1 and χ(U ′) = 0
for all proper subsets U ′ of U . Similarly, a coalition U is called a maximal losing coalition
if χ(U) = 0 and χ(U ′) = 1 for all proper supersets U ′ of U . By W we denote the set of
winning coalitions and by L the set of losing coalitions for a given simple game. The restrictions
to minimal winning coalitions and maximal losing coalitions are denoted by Wm and LM ,
respectively.
We have W ∪ L = 2N and remark that either Wm or LM uniquely characterizes a simple
game; see e.g. [30] for the details and additional facts on simple games. A well studied subclass
of simple games (and superclass of weighted games) arises from Isbell’s desirability relation
[15]:
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Definition 2.3. We write i A j (or j @ i) for two voters i, j ∈ N if we have χ
(
{i}∪U\{j}
)
≥
χ(U) for all {j} ⊆ U ⊆ N\{i} and we abbreviate i A j, j A i by i  j. A simple game χ is
called complete simple game (also called a “directed game”, see [18], or a “linear game”, see
[30]) if the binary relation A is a total preorder, i.e.
(1) i A i for all i ∈ N ,
(2) i A j or j A i for all i, j ∈ N , and
(3) i A j, j A h implies i A h for all i, j, h ∈ N .
W.l.o.g. we assume 1 A 2 A · · · A n in the following. Whenever i  j, voter i is as
influential in the game as voter j, meaning that it does not matter which one of both takes part
in a coalition, i.e. the status of the coalition (winning or losing) does not change after a swap
of two equally desirable voters. We can partition the whole set N of voters into equivalence
classes N1, . . . , Nt and say that the complete simple game consists of t types of voters. By ni
we denote the cardinality of the set Ni for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Coalitions are categorized into different
types, which can be described by a vector (m1, . . . ,mt) meaning mi-out-of-ni voters (from the
set Ni) for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Let us consider an example with n1 = n2 = 2. Due to the assumed ordering of the players
we have N1 = {1, 2} and N2 = {3, 4}. With this the vector (1, 1) is the type of the coalitions
{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, and {2, 4}. Since we have 1  2 and 3  4 either all those four coalitions
are winning or they are all losing and we can therefore speak of a winning or a losing vector.
Definition 2.4. Let χ be a simple game and Nh, 1 ≤ h ≤ t, be the classes of equally desirable
voters. We call a vector m˜ := (m1, . . . ,mt), where 0 ≤ mh ≤ |Nh| for 1 ≤ h ≤ t, a winning
vector if χ(U) = 1, where U is an arbitrary subset of N containing exactly mh elements of Nh
for 1 ≤ h ≤ t. Analogously, we call such a vector a losing vector if χ(U) = 0, where U is an
arbitrary subset of N containing exactly mh elements of Nh for 1 ≤ h ≤ t.
In the following we will always use a tilde and bold notation to indicate a vector representing
a type of a coalition. The concept of inclusion has to be slightly modified for vectors, i.e. types
of coalitions:
Definition 2.5. For two vectors a˜ = (a1, . . . , at) and b˜ = (b1, . . . , bt), representing types
of coalitions in a complete simple game, we write a˜  b˜ if we have
k∑
i=1
ai ≤
k∑
i=1
bi for all
1 ≤ k ≤ t. For a˜  b˜ and a˜ 6= b˜ we use a˜ ≺ b˜ as an abbreviation and say that they are
comparable vectors with vector a˜ being smaller than vector b˜. If neither a˜  b˜ nor b˜  a˜
holds, we write a˜ ./ b˜ and say that vector a˜ and vector b˜ are incomparable.
If (1, 1) is a winning vector in our example, so is (2, 0) while nothing can be deduced for
vector (0, 2). With Definition 2.5 at hand, we can define:
Definition 2.6. A vector m˜ = (m1, . . . ,mt) in a complete simple game χ is a shift-minimal
winning vector if m˜ is a winning vector and every vector m˜′ with m˜′ ≺ m˜ is losing. Analo-
gously, a vector m˜ is a shift-maximal losing vector if m˜ is a losing vector and every vector m˜′
with m˜′  m˜ is winning.
Similarly as for simple games, where the set Wm or LM with the inclusion are enough to
generate the entire set of winning coalitions W , for complete simple games the sets Wsm and
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LsM of the shift-minimal winning vectors (representing types of coalitions) and the maximal
losing vectors uniquely characterize the complete simple game with the operation . Weighted
games, which are a subclass of complete simple games, are now formally introduced as follows:
Definition 2.7. A simple game χ is called a weighted game (or simply weighted) if there exists a
quota q ∈ R>0 and weights w1, . . . , wn ∈ R≥0 such that χ(U) = 1 if and only if
∑
i∈U wi ≥ q.
As an abbreviation we utilize the notation χ = [q;w1, . . . , wn] or simply χ = [q;w] whenever
the weight vector w = (w1, . . . , wn) is specified.
As an example we consider the weighted game [4; 3, 2, 1, 1] (which is the same as [3; 2, 1, 1, 1]),
where we have 1 A 2 3 4 for the voters, i.e. n1 = 1 and n2 = 3. The shift-minimal winning
vectors are given by (1, 1), (0, 3) and the smax losing vectors are given by (1, 0), (0, 2). Since
(1, 2)  (1, 1) the coalition type (1, 2) is also winning and (0, 2) is losing due to (0, 2) ≺ (0, 3).
For a more extensive overview on binary voting methods we refer the interested reader to [30].
2.1. A parameterization theorem for complete simple games. Carreras and Freixas have
given a full parameterization of complete simple games in [3]. To this end we denote the (de-
creasing) lexicographic (strict) order by m, i.e. we have (a1, . . . , an) m (b1, . . . , bn) iff there is
an index 1 ≤ h ≤ n with ai = bi for all 1 ≤ i < h and ah > bh. An example is given by
(1, 2, 1)m (1, 1, 3).
Theorem 2.8. (Carreras and Freixas, 1996)
(a) Consider a vector
n = (n1, . . . , nt) ∈ Nt>0
and a matrix
M =

m1,1 m1,2 . . . m1,t
m2,1 m2,2 . . . m2,t
...
...
. . .
...
mr,1 mr,2 . . . mr,t
 =

m˜1
m˜2
...
m˜r
 .
If they satisfy the following properties:
(i) m1,1 > 0, 0 ≤ mi,j ≤ nj , mi,j ∈ N≥0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ t,
(ii) m˜i ./ m˜j for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ r,
(iii) for each 1 ≤ j < t there is at least one row-index i such that mi,j > 0, mi,j+1 <
nj+1, and
(iv) m˜i m m˜i+1 for 1 ≤ i < t,
then there exists a complete simple game χ associated to (n,M) with n as a vector of
the cardinalities of the equivalence classes and matrixM, where the rows consist of the
shift-minimal winning vectors.
(b) Two complete games (n1,M1) and (n2,M2) are isomorphic if and only if n1 = n2
andM1 =M2.
In such a vector/matrix representation of a complete simple game the number of voters n is
determined by n =
∑t
i=1 ni. Although Theorem 2.8 looks technical at first glance, the necessity
of the required properties can be explained easily. First we observe that nj ≥ 1, m1,1 > 0, and
0 ≤ mi,j ≤ nj must hold for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ t. If m˜i  m˜j or m˜i  m˜j then we
would have m˜i = m˜j or either m˜i or m˜j cannot be a shift-minimal winning vector. If for a
column-index 1 ≤ j < t we have mi,j = 0 or mi,j+1 = nj+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, then we can
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check that g  h for all g ∈ Nj , h ∈ Nj+1, which is a contradiction to the definition of the
classes Nj and therefore also for the numbers nj . A complete simple game does not change if
two rows of the matrixM are interchanged. Thus we must require some specific ordering of the
rows to avoid duplicities, e.g. m.
If all voters are equivalent, i.e. t = 1, there is a unique shift-minimal winning vector, i.e.
r = 1. In this case the requirements of Theorem 2.8 are reduced to 1 ≤ m1,1 ≤ n1 = n. Also
for t = 2 one can easily give a more compact formulation for the requirements in Theorem 2.8.
A complete description of the possible values n1, n2,m1,1,m1,2 corresponding to a complete
simple game with parameters n, t = 2, and r = 1 is given by
1 ≤ n1 ≤ n− 1, n1 + n2 = n, 1 ≤ m1,1 ≤ n1, and 0 ≤ m1,2 ≤ n2 − 1. (1)
For t = 2 and r ≥ 2 such a complete and compact description is given by
1 ≤ n1 ≤ n−1, n1+n2 = n, and mi,1 ≥ mi+1,1+1, mi,1+mi,2+1 ≤ mi+1,1+mi+1,2 (2)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1.
2.2. Recognizing and representing weighted games. In Definition 2.7 we have introduced
the notation [q;w1, . . . , wn], consisting of a quota q and weights wi, for a weighted game. As
mentioned in the introduction there are several representations for the same weighted game, e.g.
[3; 2, 1, 1, 1], [4; 3, 2, 1, 1], [11; 9, 5, 5, 4], [q; q − 1, x, x, x] and [q; q − 2, x, x, x] with q ≥ 6
and
⌈ q
3
⌉ ≤ x ≤ ⌊ q−12 ⌋ all represent the same weighted game because the subsets of N whose
weights equal or surpass the quota are invariant for all of them.
So in order to check whether two weighted games are equivalent, it makes sense to have a
closer look at the underlying discrete structure as a simple game, i.e. its characteristic function
χ : 2N = {U | U ⊆ N} → {0, 1}. As weighted games are complete simple games we often
find it useful to represent the game using the matrix representation of the previous subsection,
especially if we use different weighted representations for the same game or different weights
within an equivalence class of voters.
To decide whether a given complete simple game is weighted, we can utilize a linear program;
see [30] for an overview on other methods. From Definition 2.7 and the notion of minimal
winning and maximal losing coalitions we can conclude that a simple game is weighted if and
only if the following system of linear inequalities is feasible:∑
i∈S
wi ≥ q ∀S ∈ Wm,
∑
i∈T
wi < q ∀T ∈ LM , q ∈ R>0, and wi ∈ R≥0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n. (3)
As strict inequalities, i.e., < or >, might lead to ill-defined optimization problems like e.g.
maximize x subject to x < 1, we use an equivalent formulation instead:∑
i∈S
wi ≥ q ∀S ∈ Wm,
∑
i∈T
wi ≤ q − 1 ∀T ∈ LM , and wi ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n. (4)
As LM is not empty and the wi are non-negative, the inequality q > 0 is implied by
∑
i∈T wi ≤
q−1. By rescaling the weights we may achieve that the difference q−maxT∈LM
∑
i∈T wi is as
large as desired, e.g. at least 1. Of course here we already have integer representations in mind,
i.e. where we additionally request wi ∈ N≥0 (see Definition 2.10). The fact that each weighted
game is also a complete simple game can be used to reduce inequality system (4).
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Lemma 2.9. Given a complete simple game χ with t equivalence classes of voters the inequality
system (4) has a solution if and only if
x˜Tw ≥ q ∀ x˜ ∈ Wsm, y˜Tw ≤ q− 1 ∀ y˜ ∈ LsM , wi ≥ wi+1+1 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1, and wt ≥ 0.
(5)
has a solution.
PROOF. Let us at first assume that (q, w) is a feasible solution of (5). By setting q′ = q and
w′i = wh ≥ 0 for all i ∈ Nh we will obtain a feasible solution (q′, w′) for (4). Now let S ∈ Wm
be a minimal winning coalition, x˜′ its corresponding type, and let x˜ ∈ Wsm be a vector with
x˜  x˜′. With this we have ∑
i∈S
w′i = x˜
′Tw ≥ x˜Tw ≥ q
due to w1 > w2 > · · · > wt ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Similarly, for a maximal losing coalition
R ∈ LM with corresponding type y˜′, let y˜ ∈ LsM be a vector with y˜  y˜′, so that∑
i∈R
w′i = y˜
′Tw ≤ y˜Tw ≤ q − 1.
For the other direction let (q′, w′) be a feasible solution of (4). One can easily check that
(q′, w′′), where w′′i =
∑
j∈Ni w
′
j
|Ni| for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, is a feasible solution of (5). 
We would like to remark that those complete simple games which are not weighted can be
represented as a finite intersection of weighted games, a construction which is also used in
practice [8].
2.3. Minimum integer representations. In the previous section we have already seen some
different representations of weighted games, e.g. we may assume that the difference between
the weight of a winning coalition and the weight of a losing coalition is at least one. A special
kind of representation restricts the quota and the weights to integers:
Definition 2.10. For a given weighted game χ, with minimal winning coalitionsWm, maximal
losing coalitions LM , and t equivalence classes of voters, a vector (q, w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Nn+1≥0 is
called an integer representation if it is a feasible solution of Inequality system (4). If we have
wi = wj for all i, j ∈ Nh, where 1 ≤ h ≤ t, then we speak of an integer representation
preserving types.
We remark that each feasible solution (q, w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Nn+1≥0 of (3) also satisfies inequality
system (4). Given an integer representation we can easily construct a (possibly non-integer) rep-
resentation, where the weights are equal within equivalence classes of voters by averaging the
weights in each equivalence class, as done in the proof of Lemma 2.9. (Every convex combina-
tion of solutions of an LP is itself a solution.)
Definition 2.11. Given an integer representation (q, w1, . . . , wn) for a weighted game χ with
equivalence classes N1, . . . , Nt the averaged representation (q, w′1, . . . , w′t) is given by w′h =∑
i∈Nh wi
|Nh| .
So indeed each weighted game admits an integer representation preserving types.
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Definition 2.12. Given a weighted game χ we call an integer representation (q, w1, . . . , wn) a
minimum sum integer representation, if we have
∑n
i=1wi ≤
∑n
i=1w
′
i for all integer represen-
tations (q′, w′1, . . . , w′n). Similarly we call an integer representation (q, w1, . . . , wn) preserving
types a minimum sum integer representation preserving types, if we have
∑n
i=1wi ≤
∑n
i=1w
′
i
for all integer representations (q′, w′1, . . . , w′n) preserving types.
We remark that each weighted game admits a minimum sum integer representation and a
minimum sum integer representation preserving types, but there can exist several such represen-
tations. Introducing integer variables changes the linear programs (4) and (5) to integer linear
programs (ILP), whose solution is NP -hard in general. So, if we minimize the sum of weights∑n
i=1wi subject to the constraints in inequality system (4) restricted to integer variables, each
optimal solution corresponds to a minimum sum integer representation. Similarly, if we mini-
mize the sum of weights
∑t
i=1 niwi subject to the constraints in inequality system (5) restricted
to integer variables, each optimal solution corresponds to a minimum sum integer representation
preserving types. To our knowledge there is no known polynomial time algorithm to determine
a minimum sum integer representation. For some algebraic techniques, to determine a minimum
sum integer representation, we refer the interested reader to [2].
By considering the following LP-relaxation of the ILP for the value of a minimum sum integer
representation we can obtain a reasonable lower bound for the sum of weights in an minimum
sum integer representation:
min
t∑
i=1
wini (6)
s.t. x˜Tw ≥ q ∀ x˜ ∈ Wsm, y˜Tw ≤ q − 1 ∀ y˜ ∈ LsM , wi ≥ wi+1 + 1 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1, and wt ≥ 0.
Lemma 2.13. For a given weighted game χ with t equivalence classes of voters let ϕ be the
optimal target value of the minimization problem (6), then we have
∑n
i=1w
′
i ≥ ϕ for all integer
representations (q′, w′1, . . . , w′n) of χ.
PROOF. For a given integer representation (q′, w′1, . . . , w′n) we show that the averaged represen-
tation wi =
∑
j∈Ni w
′
j
|Ni| , q = q
′ is a feasible solution of inequality system (5) attaining the same
sum of its weights as the initial integer representation.
As in the proof of Lemma 2.9 we have w′j1 > w
′
j2
for all j1 ∈ Ni, j2 ∈ Ni+1. Since the w′j
are integers we conclude w′j1 ≥ w′j2 + 1 so that wi ≥ wi+1 + 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1. 
A more restrictive integer representation asks for the minimum possible weight for each
player simultaneously:
Definition 2.14. An integer representation (q, w1, . . . , wn) for a weighted game χ is called
minimum integer representation if for all integer representations (q′, w′1, . . . , w′n) of χ we have
wi ≤ w′i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If we restrict the allowed representations to those where the
voters of the same equivalence class Ni have an equal weight, we speak of a minimum integer
representation preserving types.
In other words, a minimum integer representation, if it exists, is the least element in the partial
order of component-wise comparison of the feasible weight vectors.
In general, both representations need not exist and indeed in this paper we study condi-
tions where they exist and give examples where they do not exist. We would like to note that
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each minimum integer representation for a weighted game is also a minimum integer repre-
sentation preserving types, since otherwise the weights could be permuted within equivalence
classes of voters. On the other hand, the existence of a minimum integer representation pre-
serving types does not imply the existence of a minimum integer representation. The example
[12; 7, 6, 6, 4, 4, 4, 3, 2] = [12; 7, 6, 6, 4, 4, 4, 2, 3] from the introduction has (14, 8, 7, 7, 5, 5, 5, 3, 3)
as a minimum integer representation preserving types.
3. GENERATING CONSPICUOUS EXAMPLES OF GAMES WITHOUT A MINIMUM INTEGER
REPRESENTATION
Motivated by the existence of weighted games without a minimum integer representation for
more than three equivalence classes of voters; see e.g. Table 3 and Table 4 of [10], we are con-
cerned in this section with this problem in the special case of t = 3 types of voters. As we shall
see below, we propose a procedure to generate weighted games with three types of voters with-
out a minimum integer representation in Subsection 3.1 based on the famous Coin-Exchange
Problem of Frobenius [1]. Similarly, the existence of weighted games without a minimum inte-
ger representation preserving types is known for more than four equivalence classes of voters;
see e.g. Table 2 in [11]. Thus the case t = 4 is under study here and we also propose a procedure
to generate weighted games with four types of voters without a minimum integer representation
preserving types in Subsection 3.1. Another objective of this section is to generate examples of
weighted games with more than two minimum sum integer representations, which is outlined
in Subsection 3.2. Finally, Subsection 3.3 concerns weighted games with a minimum integer
representation of coprime weights.
The Coin-Exchange Problem of Frobenius considers n ≥ 2 integers 0 < a1 < · · · < an
with gcd(a1, . . . , an) = 1 as denominations of n different coins. We say that a certain amount
of money A ∈ N≥0 can be represented by the given coins, if there are n numbers xi ∈ N≥0
such that A =
n∑
i=1
aixi. As an abbreviation we denote the set of representable integers A by
〈a1, . . . , an〉.
If a1 > 1 then some A cannot be represented, e.g. there do no exist representations for all
A ∈ {1, . . . , a1 − 1}. The largest such A for a given problem is called the Frobenius number
g(a1, . . . , an). Well-known results in this context are g(a1, a2) = (a1− 1)(a2− 1)− 1 and that
exactly 12(g(a1, a2) + 1) =
1
2(a1 − 1)(a2 − 1) non-negative integers are not representable for
gcd(a1, a2) = 1. As an example we consider a1 = 3, a2 = 5, where the set of non-negative
integers which are not representable is given by N≥0\〈a1, a2〉 = {1, 2, 4, 7}.
Almost all of the following constructions contain the game χa,b = [ab;
a︷ ︸︸ ︷
b, . . . , b,
b︷ ︸︸ ︷
a, . . . , a],
where b > a ≥ 1 are coprime integers, as a subgame, i.e. the winning coalitions of χa,b are
winning coalitions in the larger game and similarly the losing coalitions of χa,b are losing coali-
tions of the larger game. Our first aim is to prove a lower bound on the sum of weights of a
minimum sum integer representation of χa,b. To this end we utilize Be´zout’s identity stating that
there exist integers u, v ∈ Z with ua + bv = gcd(a, b) = 1, which can be computed using the
extended Euclidean algorithm.
Lemma 3.1. For coprime integers b > a ≥ 1 there exist u, v ∈ N>0 with ub− va = 1, u ≤ a,
v < b.
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Lemma 3.2. For coprime integers b > a ≥ 1 there exist u, v ∈ N≥0 with ub + va = ab − 1,
0 ≤ u ≤ a− 1, and 1 ≤ v ≤ b− 1.
PROOF. Using Lemma 3.1 and the identity (a− u)b+ va = ab− 1 yields the stated result. 
In the following we will often use the existence of those integers u, v without explicitly refer-
ring to Lemma 3.2. We remark that the (unique) existence of such a pair (u, v) of integers can
be concluded from Popoviciu’s theorem, which counts the number of representations for a given
amount N using two coprime integer coins a and b.
Lemma 3.3. For every integer representation (q, w1, . . . , wn) of χa,b we have
∑n
i=1wi ≥ 2ab.
PROOF. Let u, v be integers satisfying the conditions of Lemma 3.2. Due to Lemma 2.13 it
suffices to prove that the optimal solution (q′, w′1, w′2) of LP (6) has a target value of at least 2ab.
Since (v, u) is a losing vector and (a, 0), (0, b) are winning vectors we have uw′2+vw′1 ≤ q′−1,
aw′1 ≥ q′, and bw′2 ≥ q′. Multiplying the first inequality by ab yields
abuw′2 + abvw
′
1 ≤ abq′ − ab.
Adding bv times the second inequality and au times the third inequality yields
abuw′2 + abvw
′
1 ≥ (au+ bv)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ab−1
q′.
Thus we conclude abq′−q′ ≤ abq′−ab, which is equivalent to q′ ≥ ab. Next we deduce w′1 ≥ b
and w′2 ≥ a from aw′1 ≥ q′ ≥ ab and bw′2 ≥ q′ ≥ ab. Thus we have aw′1 + bw′2 ≥ 2ab. 
Corollary 3.4. Let χ be a weighted voting game with equivalence classesN1, . . . , Nt, 1 ≤ i1 <
i2 ≤ t be two indices, and N ′1 ⊂ Ni1 , N ′2 ⊂ Ni2 be two subsets. Consider two coprime integers
b > a ≥ 1, such that |N ′1| = a and |N ′2| = b. If the restriction of χ to N ′1 ∪N ′2 is equivalent to
χa,b, then we have q ≥ ab, wi1 ≥ b, and wi2 ≥ a for the optimal solution (q, w1, . . . , wt) of the
linear program (6).
3.1. Weighted games without a minimum integer representation for small t. In order to
construct a weighted game without a minimum integer representation for t = 3 equivalence
classes of voters we choose two coprime integers b > a ≥ 1 and an integer c satisfying
(1) ab− c /∈ 〈a, b〉,
(2) ab− 2c+ 1 ∈ 〈a, b〉,
(3) ab ≥ 2c− 1, and
(4) c ≥ b+ 2.
With this we consider the weighted game
χa,b,c = [ab; c− 1
2
, c− 1
2
, b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
],
i.e. in the notation of a complete simple game the cardinality vector is given by n = (2, a, b).
These technically looking constraints can be interpreted as follows. Due to b ≥ a + 1 ≥ 1
and c ≥ b + 2 the assignment q = ab, w1 = a, w2 = b, w3 = c − 12 is a feasible solution of
inequality system (5) for χa,b,c. We remark w1 = c− 12 /∈ N. Constraint (1) requires that every
(shift-maximal) losing vector l˜ = (1, l2, l3) has a weight of at most q − 32 , while constraints (2)
and (3) ensure that there exists a winning vector m˜t = (2, t2, t3) whose weight equals exactly
the quota q, i.e. 2c− 1 + t2b+ t3a = ab.
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Lemma 3.5. The sum of weights of a minimum sum integer representation of χa,b,c is at least
2c− 1 + 2ab.
PROOF. Let (q′, w′1, w′2, w′3) be the optimal solution of the linear program minimizing the sum
of weights. From Corollary 3.4 we conclude q′ ≥ ab, w′2 ≥ b, and w′3 ≥ a. Since the, above
defined, vector m˜t = (2, t2, t3), is winning we have 2w′1 + t2w′2 + t3w′3 ≥ q′ ≥ ab. Using
bt2 + at3 = ab− 2c+ 1 we conclude
2w′1 + aw
′
2 + bw
′
3 = 2w
′
1 + t2w
′
2 + t3w
′
3 + (a− t2)w′2 + (b− t3)w′3
≥ ab+ (a− t2)b+ (b− t3)a = 2ab+ ab− t2b− t3a = 2c− 1 + 2ab
and finally apply Lemma 2.13. 
Next we show that τ1 = (ab, c, c−1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . a) and τ2 = (ab, c−1, c, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
are minimum sum integer representations of χa,b,c. Due to Lemma 3.5 it remains to show that
both vectors are integer representations. Coalitions of type (0,m2,m3) or (2,m2,m3) have
the same weight according to all three different weight vectors (including τ0 = (c − 12 , c −
1
2 , b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)). Now let (1,m2,m3) be a winning vector. From the definition of the
game χa,b,c, i.e. τ0, we conclude c− 12 +m2b+m3a ≥ ab, which can be slightly sharpened to
c− 1 +m2b+m3a ≥ ab. Thus for both weightings τ1 and τ2 the lightest coalition, i.e. the one
with minimal weight, of type (1,m2,m3) has at least a weight of c − 1 + m2b + m3a ≥ ab.
Now let (1, l2, l3) be a losing coalition. Since ab−c /∈ 〈a.b〉 we have c− 12 +bl2+al3 ≤ ab− 32 .
Thus for both weightings τ1 and τ2 the heaviest coalition of type (1, l2, l3) has a weight of at
most a weight of c+m2b+m3a ≤ ab− 1.
The final conclusion is that χa,b,c cannot admit a minimum integer representation since it has
at least two minimum sum integer representations. An example where the requested technical
conditions on a, b, and c are satisfied is given by c = 12, b = 7, a = 5.
Instead of using the general Lemma 3.5 we can consider the example directly. The game
χ5,7,12 is a complete simple game with t = 3 types of voters whose vector/matrix notation is
given by n = (2, 5, 7) and M =
2 2 1 1 1 0 0 01 0 2 1 0 5 3 0
1 3 2 4 5 0 3 7
T . The matrix of the shift-
maximal losing vectors is given by
2 2 1 1 0 01 0 3 1 4 2
0 2 0 3 1 4
T . Solving the LP (6) yields the op-
timal solution (35, 11.5, 7, 5). Thus we conclude from Lemma 2.13 that the sum of the weights
in a minimum sum integer representation is at least 93. Now we can easily check that both
(35, 12, 11, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5) and (35, 11, 12, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5) are integer
representations of χ5,7,12 attaining this lower bound. We remark that the stated representations
arise by a swap of weights within the first equivalence class.
For t = 4 equivalence classes and for the situation of integer representations preserving types,
we apply a similar idea and consider a game χ with cardinality vector n = (1, 1, a, b) containing
χa,b as a subgame. The rough idea is to choose half-integer weights w1, w2 ∈ N + 12 such that
(ab, w1, w2, b, a) is an optimal solution of LP (6) while bw1c or bw2c can be attained in (differ-
ent) integer representations. Similarly as in the example above, sufficient technical conditions
can be formulated using the membership or non-membership of certain values in 〈a, b〉. We
refrain from explicitly formulating the details and instead give an example. We choose b = 11
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and a = 7, which satisfy {52, 59} ∩ 〈7, 11〉 = ∅ and 52 + 59 − 7 · 11 + 1 ∈ 〈7, 11〉. The
game χ now is uniquely chosen by stating its matrix of shift-minimal winning vectors: M =
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 5 3 1 0 5 3 1 0 7 6 4 2 0
2 5 0 3 6 8 1 4 7 9 0 2 5 8 11

T
. The matrix of the shift-maximal
losing vectors is then given by

1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
3 1 4 2 0 5 4 2 0 6 5 3 1
0 3 1 4 7 0 2 5 8 1 3 6 9

T
. Solving the
LP (6) yields the optimal solution (77, 24.5, 17.5, 11, 7). The sum of weights of a minimum sum
integer representation is at least 196. By checking that both (77, 25, 17, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11,
7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7) and (77, 24, 18, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7) are
integer representations of χ we conclude that they are indeed minimum sum integer represen-
tations preserving types. Thus χ does not admit a minimum integer representation preserving
types.
3.2. Weighted games with more than two minimum sum integer representations. It would
be nice to have an example of a weighted game with more than two minimum sum representa-
tions preserving types. Before we give a construction that works, we briefly remark that not ev-
ery reasonable system of constraints for the representability of some expressions needs to have a
solution, so that not all construction ideas lead to success. Our first idea was to choose t = 4, two
coprime integers b > a ≥ 1 and n = (1, 1, a, b). If there existed integers 0 < l2 < l1 − 1 < ab
such that l1, l1 + 1, l2, l2 + 1 /∈ 〈a, b〉 but ab − l1 − l2 + 2 ∈ 〈a, b〉, then we could check that
(ab, ab− l2 − 2 + x, ab− l1 − 2 + (2− x), b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a) is a minimum sum integer repre-
sentation for x ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Unfortunately the existence of such integers l1, l2 would contradict
Popoviciu’s theorem counting the number of representations, see e.g. [1]. To be more precisely,
ab− k ∈ 〈a, b〉 implies k /∈ 〈a, b〉 for all k ∈ N with a, b 6 |k.
For t = 5 we have another construction which works:
Proposition 3.6. Let b > a ≥ 1 be two coprime positive integers. Suppose we have integers
l1 < l2 < l3 fulfilling
(1) b < ŵi = ab− li − 1, li /∈ 〈a, b〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3,
(2) l1 + l2 + l3 − li − ab /∈ 〈a, b〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, and
(3) 0 < l1 + l2 + l3 + 1− 2ab < ab, l1 + l2 + l3 + 1− 2ab ∈ 〈a, b〉.
With this the weighted game χ = [ab; ŵ1, ŵ2 + 1, ŵ3 + 1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a], where n =
(1, 1, 1, a, b), has the following three minimum sum integer representations preserving types:
• τ1 = (ab, ŵ1, ŵ2 + 1, ŵ3 + 1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
• τ2 = (ab, ŵ1 + 1, ŵ2, ŵ3 + 1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
• τ3 = (ab, ŵ1 + 1, ŵ2 + 1, ŵ3, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
PROOF. Let (q′, w′1, w′2, w′3, w′4, w′5) be the optimal solution of the linear program minimizing
the sum of weights. From Corollary 3.4 we conclude q′ ≥ ab, w′4 ≥ b, and w′5 ≥ a. Since
l1+ l2+ l3+1− 2ab ∈ 〈a, b〉, see constraint (3), there exist integers u, v such that (1, 1, 1, u, v)
is a (shift-minimal) winning vector and ub + va = l1 + l2 + l3 + 1 − 2ab. Thus we have
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w′1 + w′2 + w′3 + uw′4 + vw′5 ≥ q′. Inserting this into the sum of all weights yields
w′1 + w
′
2 + w
′
3 + aw
′
4 + bw
′
5 ≥ q′ + (a− u)w′4 + (b− v)w′5
≥ ab+ 2ab− (ub+ va) = 2ab+ ŵ1 + ŵ2 + ŵ3 + 2,
i.e. each minimum sum integer representation has a weight of at least 2ab+ ŵ1 + ŵ2 + ŵ3 + 2
due Lemma 2.13.
The next step is to prove that the three stated weightings represent the game χ. So for each
vector (m1,m2,m3,m4,m5) we have to prove that its weight is less then ab or at least ab in
all three different weightings simultaneously. This can be easily verified for the cases where
m1 +m2 +m3 ∈ {0, 3}.
Form1+m2+m3 = 1 let (1, 0, 0,m4,m5) be a losing vector, i.e. we have ŵ1+m4b+m5a =
ab−l1−1+m4b+m5a ≤ ab−1. In τ2 and τ3 the weight of the first player is increased by one, so
we need ab−l1−1+m4b+m5a ≤ ab−2, which is indeed true since ab−l1−1+m4b+m5a =
ab − 1 is equivalent to l1 ∈ 〈a, b〉, i.e. it contradicts constraint (1). Increasing the weight of
player one in a winning coalition does not affect its status. Now we consider a winning vector
(0, 1, 0,m4,m5), i.e. we have ŵ2 + 1 +m4b +m5a = ab − l2 +m4b +m5a ≥ ab. In τ2 the
weight of the second player is decreased by one, so that we need ab− l2+m4b+m5a ≥ ab+1,
which is true since ab − l2 +m4b +m5a = ab is equivalent to l2 ∈ 〈a, b, 〉. Due to symmetry
we conclude that there are no contradictions for m3 = 1.
For m1 +m2 +m3 = 2 let (1, 1, 0,m4,m5) be a losing vector, i.e. we have ŵ1 + ŵ2 + 1 +
m4b +m5a = 2ab − l1 − l2 − 1 +m4b +m5a ≤ ab − 1. Due to l1 + l2 /∈ 〈a, b〉 the vector
has a weight of at most ab − 2 using the weights from τ1. Thus the vector remains losing in τ2
and τ3. Increasing the weight of player one in a winning coalition does not affect its status. A
symmetric argument applies for vectors of type (1, 0, 1,m4,m5). Now let (0, 1, 1,m4,m5) be a
winning vector, i.e. we have ŵ2 + ŵ3 + 2 +m4b+m5a = 2ab− l1 − l2 +m4b+m5a ≥ ab.
Due to l1+ l2 /∈ 〈a, b〉 the vector has a weight of at least ab+1 using the weights from τ1. Thus
the vector remains winning in τ2 and τ3. Decreasing the weight of either player two or player
three by one does not cause any problems for a losing coalition.
Thus we have exhaustively checked that τ1, τ2, and τ3 are minimum sum integer representa-
tions preserving types. 
An example where the requirements of the previous proposition are fulfilled is given by a =
17, b = 13, l1 = 157, l2 = 161, l3 = 174, ŵ1 = 63, ŵ2 = 59, and ŵ3 = 46. A smaller example
is given by a = 13, b = 11, l1 = 93, l2 = 97, l3 = 106, ŵ1 = 49, ŵ2 = 45, and ŵ3 = 36.
Furthermore we have the following straightforward generalization:
Proposition 3.7. Let b > a ≥ 1 be two coprime integers with a > b and t be an integer with
t ≥ 2. Suppose we have integers l1 < l2 < · · · < lt fulfilling
(1) b < ŵi = ab− li − 1, li /∈ 〈a, b〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3,
(2)
z∑
j=1
lij − (z − 1)ab /∈ 〈a, b〉 for all 2 ≤ z < t and all subsets {i1, . . . , iz} ⊆ {1, . . . , t}
of cardinality z, and
(3) 0 <
t∑
j=1
lj + 1− (t− 1)ab < ab,
t∑
j=1
lj + 1− (t− 1)ab ∈ 〈a, b〉.
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With this the weighted game χ = [ab; ŵ1, ŵ2 + 1, . . . , ŵt + 1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a], where n =
(1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
, a, b), has the following t minimum sum integer representations preserving types:
• (ab, ŵ1, ŵ2 + 1, . . . , ŵt + 1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
• (ab, ŵ1 + 1, ŵ2, ŵ3 + 1 . . . , ŵt + 1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
...
• (ab, ŵ1 + 1, . . . , ŵt−1 + 1, ŵt, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
For t ≥ 4 we have the following examples:
t a b l1, . . . , lt
4 19 11 141, 157, 160, 179
5 19 17 249, 251, 253, 268, 287
6 29 17 389, 396, 401, 418, 430, 447
7 31 29 746, 750, 752, 777, 779, 808, 810
8 37 29 883, 891, 920, 941, 949, 970, 978, 1007
9 41 31 1086, 1100, 1106, 1117, 1127, 1137, 1158, 1168, 1199
10 43 41 1513, 1550, 1552, 1554, 1593, 1595, 1597, 1636, 1638, 1679
Conjecture 3.8. Each weighted game with t equivalence classes of voters can have at most t−2
different minimum sum representations preserving types.
3.3. Possible weights of minimum integer representations. Instead of asking which classes
of weighted games admit a minimum integer representation or a minimum integer representation
preserving types one can ask which weights are possible in a minimum integer representation.
The following theorem and remarks resolve this question for two different weights almost com-
pletely. The stated lower bounds on the number of necessary voters n might be improved.
Theorem 3.9. For two coprime integers b > a ≥ 1 the weighted game χ = [q = ab; b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
n2
],
where n1 ≥ a and n2 ≥ b, is in minimum integer representation.
PROOF. Let (q′, b′1, . . . , b′n1 , a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n2) be an arbitrary integer representation of χ, where we
assume b′1 ≥ · · · ≥ b′n1 and a′1 ≥ · · · ≥ a′n2 ≥ 0 w.l.o.g. From Isbell’s desirability relation we
conclude b′n1 > a
′
1. By Corollary 3.4 every integer representation of χ has a sum of weights of
at least n1b+n2a and q′ ≥ ab,
∑n1
i=1 b
′
i ≥ n1b,
∑n2
i=1 a
′
i ≥ n2a. It suffices to show b′n1 ≥ b and
a′n2 ≥ a.
If a′n2 < a we can assume a
′
n2 = a − 1, since convex combinations of feasible weightings
are feasible. By averaging the weights a′1, . . . a′n2−1 and b
′
1, . . . , b
′
n1 we obtain the (feasible,
possibly non-integer) weighting (q′, b+ t, . . . , b+ t, a+ s, . . . , a+ s, a− 1), where s ∈ Q>0,
t ∈ Q≥0.
Let 0 ≤ u ≤ a − 1 and 0 ≤ v ≤ b − 1 be two integers with ub + va = q − 1 = ab − 1.
Rearranging yields u = a− 1+avb so that b divides 1+ av and we have b < av. Since (u, v) is a
losing vector and (a, 0), (0, b) are winning vectors we have
ub+ ut+ av + vs ≤ q′ − 1, ab+ at ≥ q′, and ab+ bs− s− 1 ≥ q′. (7)
Multiplying the first inequality by ab yields
ab2u+ abut+ a2bv + abvs ≤ abq′ − ab
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and bu times the second inequality plus av times the third inequality yields
ab2u+ abtu+ a2bv + absv − avs− av ≥ abq′ − q′
Combining the last two inequalities yields
q′ ≥ ab+ (s+ 1)av. (8)
We already know ab+ bs− s−1 ≥ q′ and conclude (b−1)s−1 ≥ (s+1)av. Inserting b < av
yields the contradiction −s− 1 > b. Thus a′n2 ≥ a.
If b′n1 < b we can assume b
′
n1 = b − 1 and consider the weighting (q′, b + t, . . . , b + t, b −
1, a + s, . . . , a + s), with t ∈ Q>0, s ∈ Q≥0. Let again 0 ≤ u ≤ a − 1 and 0 ≤ v ≤ b − 1 be
two integers with ub+ va = q − 1 = ab− 1. Here we have a < ub. An analogous calculation
as before yields
q′ ≥ ab+ (t+ 1)ub
and
q′ ≤ ab+ (a− 1)t− 1.
Combining these two inequalities yields (a− 1)t− 1 ≥ (t+ 1)ub. Inserting a < ub ends up in
the contradiction −t− 1 > a. 
In the following remark we want to emphasize that most of the requirements of Theorem 3.9
are necessary:
Remark 3.10.
(1) If r = gcd(a, b) > 1, then
[ q
r ,
b
r , . . . ,
b
r ,
a
r , . . . ,
a
r
]
is a smaller representation for the
same game.
(2) If b = a then there is only one type of voters with minimum representation [q′; 1, . . . , 1]
for a suitable quota q′. If b < a then the voters of type 2 would be more powerful than
the voters of type 1, which is not possible by definition.
(3) If a = 0 and b > 1 then
[⌈ q
b
⌉
, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0
]
is a smaller representation for the
same game, which is indeed the minimum integer representation.
(4) The lower bounds on n1 and n2 can be improved, e.g. based on the knowledge of u and
v.
There is a generalization to weighted games with more than two types of voters:
Theorem 3.11. Let a1, . . . , at be integers such that a1 > a2 > · · · > at > 0 and for each
1 ≤ i ≤ t there is an index 1 ≤ j ≤ t with gcd(ai, aj) = 1. The weighted game
χ = [q = lcm(a1, . . . , at); a1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
, . . . , at, . . . , at︸ ︷︷ ︸
nt
],
where ni ≥ lcm(a1, . . . , at)/ai for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, is in minimum integer representation.
PROOF. For an arbitrary integer representation of χ let (q′, a′1, . . . , a′t) be the averaged repre-
sentation with equal (possibly non-integer) weights within each equivalence class of voters. For
each index 1 ≤ i ≤ t choose a suitable index j 6= i such that gcd(ai, aj) = 1. Let z = qaiaj ∈ N
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and 0 ≤ u ≤ aj − 1, 0 ≤ v ≤ ai − 1 be two integers such that uai + vaj = aiaj − 1. With this
we have
−
(
(z − 1) aj + u
)
a′i − va′j + q′ ≥ 1
(z − 1)aja′i + aia′j − q′ ≥ 0
zaja
′
i − q′ ≥ 0.
Combining these inequalities with the vectors (ai, v, ai − v), (aj , aj − u, u), and
(zaiaj , zajv, (z − 1)aj(ai − v) + aiu) as multipliers yields a′i ≥ ai, a′j ≥ aj , and q′ ≥ q.
We can treat the case of different weights within equivalence classes of voters analogously to
the proof of the previous theorem. 
In the next theorem we pay for less restrictive conditions on the weights ai by a rather large
bound on the number of voters n. To this end we generalize Lemma 3.2 for more than two
integers:
Lemma 3.12. Let a1, . . . , at be positive integers with t ≥ 2 and gcd(a1, . . . , at) = g. There
exist t integers ui with
t∑
i=1
uiai =
∏t
i=1 ai − g and 0 ≤ ui ≤
t∏
j=1,j 6=i
aj − 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
PROOF. We prove by induction on t. For t = 2 we apply Lemma 3.2 for the two integers a1g ,
a2
g . For t > 2 let u
′
i be integers with
t−1∑
i=1
u′iai =
∏t−1
i=1 ai − g′ =: k and 0 ≤ u′i ≤
t−1∏
j=1,j 6=i
aj − 1
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t − 1, where g′ = gcd(a1, . . . , a′t−1). We remark gcd(k, at) = g and apply
Lemma 3.12 for t = 2. 
Theorem 3.13. For integers a1 > a2 > · · · > at > 0 with gcd(a1, . . . , at) = 1 the weighted
game
χ = [q =
t∏
j=1
aj ; a1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
, . . . , at, . . . , at︸ ︷︷ ︸
nt
],
where ni ≥ 2
t∏
j=1,j 6=i
aj for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, is in minimum integer representation.
PROOF. Due to Lemma 3.12 there are t integers ui with
t∑
i=1
uiai = q − 1 and 0 ≤ ui ≤
t∏
j=1,j 6=i
aj −1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. For an arbitrary integer representation of χ let (q′, a′1, . . . , a′t) be
the averaged representation with equal (possibly non-integer) weights within each equivalence
class of voters. With this the following inequalities have to be valid:
q
ai
· a′i − q′ ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t and −
t∑
i=1
uia
′
i + q
′ ≥ 1.
Summing up aiui times the ith inequality plus q times the last inequality yields q′ ≥ q. Inserting
this into the ith inequality gives a′i ≥ ai for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
We can treat the case of different weights within equivalence classes of voters analogously to
the proofs of the previous theorems. 
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The condition gcd(a1, . . . , at) = 1 is necessary. If we also want to use zero weights we can
utilize the next lemma:
Lemma 3.14. The weighted game [q; a1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
, . . . , at, . . . , at︸ ︷︷ ︸
nt
], where ai > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t,
is in minimum integer representation if and only if the weighted game [q; a1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
, . . . , at, . . . , at︸ ︷︷ ︸
nt
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
nt+1
]
is in minimum integer representation.
4. WEIGHTED GAMES WITH MINIMUM INTEGER REPRESENTATIONS FOR TWO TYPES OF
VOTERS
As we have remarked in the introduction, all complete simple games with just one type of voters,
t = 1, are weighted and admit a minimum integer representation with all weights being equal
to 1. These games are called “symmetric“, “anonymous“ or “k-out-of-n-games“ in the literature.
In the previous section we have constructed weighted games with t = 3 equivalence classes
without a minimum integer representation. So the central question of this section (and the paper)
is: what happens for two types of voters? We first state the main result.
Theorem 4.1. Each weighted game with two types of voters admits a minimum integer represen-
tation (q,
n1︷ ︸︸ ︷
w1, . . . , w1,
n2︷ ︸︸ ︷
w2, . . . , w2), with 1 ≤ w1 ≤ max(n1 + 1, n2), 0 ≤ w2 ≤ max(n1, n2 −
1), and 1 ≤ q ≤ (n1 + n2 − 1) · max(n1 + 1, n2). For r ≥ 2 shift-minimal winning vec-
tors the bounds of minimum weights can be sharpened to 1 ≤ w1 ≤ n2, 1 ≤ w2 ≤ n1, and
w2 + 1 ≤ q ≤ 2n1n2.
In Section 5 we will use the bounds on q, w1, and w2 to give an upper bound on the number of
weighted voting games with two types of voters. As preliminary work we prove Theorem 4.1 for
some special cases of weighted games with two types of voters by a direct argumentation on the
possible integer representations in Subsection 4.1. The proof strategy for the remaining part is
more involved. We study linear minimization problems subject to the constraints in (5). It turns
out that each target function without negative coefficients admits an optimal integer solution. By
additionally using some structure result on the set of inequalities, which attain equality, called
tight later on, we deduce the existence of a minimum integer representation.
4.1. Proof of the main theorem for r = 1 shift-minimal winning vectors.
Theorem 4.2. For a weighted game χ with two types of voters, a cardinality vector n = (n1, n2)
and a unique minimal winning coalition m˜ = (m1,m2), i.e. t = 2 and r = 1, there exists a
minimum integer representation.
PROOF. Since the game is weighted there are some restrictions on the parameters m1, m2
beyond those from (1), i.e. 1 ≤ n1 ≤ n−1, n1+n2 = n, 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n1, and 0 ≤ m2 ≤ n2−1.
First we exclude the cases where 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n1 − 1 and 2 ≤ m2 ≤ n2 − 2. Assume that
(q, w1, w2) is a feasible solution of (5). Since (m1 − 1,m2 + 2), (m1 + 1,m2 − 2) are losing
vectors and (m1,m2) is a winning vector we have
(m1 − 1)w1 + (m2 + 2)w2 ≤ q − 1 ≤ m1w1 +m2w2 − 1,
(m1 + 1)w1 + (m2 − 2)w2 ≤ q − 1 ≤ m1w1 +m2w2 − 1,
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from which we conclude 2w2 ≤ w1 − 1 ≤ 2w2 − 2; a contradiction. It will turn out that χ is
weighted in the remaining cases, i.e. for m1 = n1 or m2 ∈ {0, 1, n2 − 1}.
Let (q, a1, . . . , an1 , b1, . . . , bn2) be an arbitrary integer representation with a1 ≥ · · · ≥ an1
and b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bn2 of the game χ. Due to Isbell’s desirability relation we have an1 ≥ b1 + 1.
• 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n1 − 1, m2 = 0:
We can easily check that a1 = · · · = an1 = 1, b1 = · · · = bn2 = 0, q = m1 is an
integer representation of χ. Since we have ai ≥ 1 and bj ≥ 0 it is also a minimum
integer representation.
• 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n1 − 1, m2 = 1:
Since (m1, 0) and (m1 − 1, n2) are losing vectors, we can conclude bi ≥ 1 for all 1 ≤
i ≤ n2 and ai ≥ n2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n1. We can easily check that a1 = · · · = an1 = n2,
b1 = · · · = bn2 = 1, q = m1n2 + 1 is an integer representation of χ and thus is indeed
a minimum integer representation.
• 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n1 − 1, m2 = n2 − 1:
Since the cases m2 ∈ {0, 1} were dealt previously, we assume m2 ≥ 2.
For m1 + n2− 1 ≤ n1 the vector (m1 + n2− 2, 0) is losing. Comparing the weights
of its corresponding coalitions with those from the shift-minimal winning vector and
inserting ai ≥ bj + 1 yields bj ≥ n2 − 1 and ai ≥ n2. We can easily check that
a1 = · · · = an1 = n2, b1 = · · · = bn2 = n2 − 1, q = m1n2 + (n2 − 1)2 is an integer
representation of χ.
For m1 + n2 − 1 > n1 we compare the losing vector (n1,m1 + n2 − 2 − n1) with
the shift-minimal winning vector and insert ai ≥ bj + 1 to deduce bj ≥ n1 −m1 + 1
and ai ≥ n1 − m1 + 2. We can easily check that a1 = · · · = an1 = n1 + 2 − m1,
b1 = · · · = bn2 = n1 + 1 −m1, q = (m1 + n2)(n1 + 1 −m1) + 2m1 − n1 − 1 is an
integer representation of χ.
• m1 = n1, 0 ≤ m2 ≤ n2 − 1:
If m2 = 0 then a1 = · · · = an1 = 1, b1 = · · · = bn2 = 0, q = n1 is a minimum integer
representation. Otherwise we have the losing vectors (n1,m2−1) and (n1−1, n2) from
which we conclude bi ≥ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 and ai ≥ n2 −m2 +1, respectively. Thus
we have q ≥ n1(n2 −m2 + 1) +m2. We can easily check that equality is possible, so
that ai = n2 −m2 + 1 ≥ 2, bj = 1, q = n1(n2 −m2 + 1) +m2 is a minimum integer
representation.

Going over the cases of the proof of Theorem 4.2 we can check that all stated minimum
integer representations satisfy 1 ≤ w1 ≤ max(n1 + 1, n2) and 0 ≤ w2 ≤ max(n1, n2 − 1) so
that 1 ≤ q ≤ (n1 + n2 − 1) ·max(n1 + 1, n2), as stated in Theorem 4.1.
To reduce the need for case differentiations in the remaining part we now completely handle
the cases where null voters or dummies, i.e. voters i such that χ(U) = χ(U ∪{i}) for all subsets
U ⊆ N\{i}, occur.
Lemma 4.3. Weighted games with two types of voters, where one class consists of null voters,
admit a minimum integer representation.
PROOF. If, as usual, the equivalence classes of the game χ are given by N1, N2, then N2 has
to be the set of null voters. By the definition of a null voter each shift-minimal winning vector
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(m1,m2) has to satisfy m2 = 0. Since shift-minimal winning vectors are incomparable, we
have r = 1 and can apply Theorem 4.2. 
Also in general we can drop null voters from given games when determining minimum integer
representations or minimum sum integer representations (preserving types or not).
Lemma 4.4. Let χ be a weighted game with k null voters and χ′ be the (weighted) game arising
from χ by deleting the k null voters. If (q, w1, . . . , wn−k) is an integer representation of χ′, then
(q, w1, . . . , wn−k, 0, . . . , 0) is an integer representation of χ.
4.2. Proof of the main theorem for r > 1 shift-minimal winning vectors. In the following
we restrict our considerations to games without null voters and r > 1 shift-minimal winning
vectors. In this case we can drop two constraints from inequality system (5).
Lemma 4.5. For a weighted game χ without null voters and with t = 2, r > 1 every vector
(q, w1, w2) is feasible for inequality system (5) if and only if it satisfies
x˜Tw ≥ q ∀ x˜ ∈ Wsm, y˜Tw ≤ q − 1 ∀ y˜ ∈ LsM . (9)
PROOF. It remains to prove that the constraints from (9) imply w1 ≥ w2 + 1 and w2 ≥ 0.
Let (a, b) ∈ Wsm with minimal a, i.e. all (m1,m2) ∈ Wsm satisfy m1 ≥ a. If a ≥ 1 and
b < n2, then (a− 1, n2) ∈ LsM . With this we conclude
aw1 + bw2 ≥ q ≥ (a− 1)w1 + n2w2 + 1,
which is equivalent to w1 ≥ (n2−b)w2+1 ≥ w2+1. If a = 0 or b = n2 then let (c, d) ∈ Wsm
with minimal c > a, i.e. for all (m1,m2) ∈ Wsm we either have m1 = a or m1 ≥ c. With this
we have (c− 1, a+ b− c) ∈ LsM and conclude
cw1 + dw2 ≥ q ≥ (c− 1)w1 + (a+ b− c)w2 + 1,
which is equivalent to w1 ≥ (a+ b− c− d)w2+1 ≥ w2+1. Thus in both cases the constraints
from (9) imply w1 ≥ w2 + 1.
In order to deduce w2 ≥ 0 we consider a winning vector (m1,m2) with m2 > 0, which
must exist since χ does not contain null voters. Thus (m1,m2 − 1) is a losing vector. Now let
(l1, l2) be a shift-maximal losing vector with (l1, l2)  (m1,m2 − 1), i.e. we have l1 ≥ m1
and l1 + l2 ≥ m1 + m2 − 1. From (l1, l2)  (m1,m2) we conclude l1 + l2 < m1 + m2,
so that only l1 + l2 = m1 + m2 − 1 is possible. With this we have m1w1 + m2w2 ≥ q ≥
l1w1 + l2w2 + 1, which is equivalent to (l1 −m1)w1 + 1 ≤ (m2 − l2). Inserting w1 ≥ w2 + 1
yields (l1−m1)w2+1+ (l1−m1) ≤ (m2− l2)w2, so that we have w2 ≥ 1+ l1−m1 ≥ 1. 
Let us consider an example of inequality system (9) for the complete simple game χ uniquely
characterized by n = (3, 3) andM =
(
2 1 0
0 3 5
)T
. The shift-maximal losing vectors are given
by (1, 2) and (0, 4), so that Inequality system (9) reads as follows.
2w1 ≥ q, w1 + 3w2 ≥ q, 5w2 ≥ q, w1 + 2w2 ≤ q − 1, and 4w2 ≤ q − 1.
If we minimize one of the objective functions f1(q, w1, w2) = q, f2(q, w1, w2) = w1, or
f3(q, w1, w2) = w2 w1 subject to those constraints, we obtain the optimal solution q = 10,
w1 = 5, w2 = 2 in all three cases. It is quite remarkable that those values are integers while we
have only requested that they are real-valued. It will turn out that this is a general phenomenon
in our context.
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Optimal solutions of linear programs are strongly connected with solutions of linear equation
systems, since it is well known that, if a linear program admits an optimal solution, then there
is an optimal solution attained at a corner of the set of feasible points. To this end we say that
an inequality of a linear program is tight for a given feasible point if equality is attained. In
our example the inequalities 2w1 ≥ q, 5w2 ≥ q, and w1 + 2w2 ≤ q − 1 are tight for the point
(10, 5, 2), while the inequalities w1 + 3w2 ≥ q and 4w2 ≤ q − 1 are not. In our context each
corner is the solution of an equation system of three tight inequalities, as we have three (linearly
independent) variables.
In Lemma 4.6, Lemma 4.7, and Lemma 4.8 we check all possible 3-element subsets of the
inequalities of (9). It turns out that whenever the corresponding 3 × 3-equation system has a
unique solution, all variables attain integer values.
So each optimal vertex of the linear program in Lemma 4.5 is determined by three tight
inequalities of one of the types m˜Tw ≥ q or l˜Tw ≤ q − 1, since w1, w2, q ≥ 0 cannot be
attained with equality. In the following three lemmas we consider the possible cases.
Lemma 4.6. For Inequality system (9), three tight inequalities of type m˜Tw ≥ q or three tight
inequalities of type l˜Tw ≤ q − 1 have to be either linearly dependent or do not determine a
solution at all.
PROOF. Consider the equation system aw1 + bw2 = cw1 + dw2 = ew1 + fw2 = z, where
z ∈ {q, q − 1}. Eliminating z leaves (a − c)w1 + (b − d)w2 = (c − e)w1 + (d − f)w2 = 0,
which has either the unique solution w1 = w2 = 0, which is infeasible for the whole inequality
system, or an infinite number of solutions due to scaling. (In the latter case the equations are
linearly dependent.) 
Lemma 4.7. For Inequality system (9), two tight inequalities of type m˜Tw ≥ q and one tight
inequality of type l˜Tw ≤ q − 1 lead to an integer solution (q̂, ŵ1, ŵ2) such that w1 ≥ ŵ1,
w2 ≥ ŵ2, and q ≥ q̂ for all feasible (q, w1, w2) or do not determine a solution at all.
PROOF. Let (a, b), (c, d) ∈ Wsm and (e, f) ∈ LsM be the vectors corresponding to the tight
inequalities, where we assume a > c. From (a, b) ./ (c, d) and a > c we conclude d > b + 1.
Solving the corresponding equation system yields ŵ1 = d−bQ , ŵ2 =
a−c
Q , and q̂ =
ad−bc
Q , where
Q := fc − fa + ad − bc − ed + eb ∈ Z. The case Q = 0 corresponds to an equation system
which does not have a unique solution. Since we know that each feasible solution of (9) satisfies
w1, w2 > 0 we can assume Q > 0 in the following.
Let g := gcd(a − c, d − b) ≥ 1. For the weights ŵ1, ŵ2 we can easily check that coalition
type (a, b) has the same weight as coalition type (a′, b′) =
(
a− a−cg , b+ d−bg
)
. If (a′, b′) is
not a winning vector, then (q̂, ŵ1, ŵ2) cannot be a feasible solution. Thus (a′, b′) is a shift-
minimal winning vector too. If g > 1 then we have a > a′ > c. We can check Q′ :=
fc− fa′ + a′d− b′c− ed+ eb′ =
(
1− 1g
)
·Q > 0. Thus we can assume w.l.o.g. that a > c is
minimal within the set of shift-minimal winning vectors corresponding to tight inequalities, i.e.
we can assume g = 1.
Now we apply Lemma 3.1 and choose unique integers u, v fulfilling u(d− b)−v(a− c) = 1,
where 0 < u ≤ a − c and 0 ≤ v < d − b. The coalition type (e′, f ′) = (a − u, b + v)
has weight q̂ − 1Q and thus is losing. Since all losing coalitions have weight at most q − 1 we
conclude Q = 1. Thus (e′, f ′) is indeed a shift-maximal losing vector corresponding to a tight
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inequality. We can easily check Q′ = f ′c−f ′a+ad− bc−e′d+e′b = 1 so that we can assume
(e, f) = (e′, f ′) since this characterizes the same solution.
Let us have a closer look at the corresponding inequality system again:
aw1 + bw2 − q ≥ 0, cw1 + dw2 − q ≥ 0, and − ew1 − fw2 + q ≥ 1.
For the basis (w1, w2, q) the inverse matrix is given by
M−1 =
1
Q
·
 d− f f − b d− be− c a− e a− c
ed− cf af − eb ad− bc
 .
If we can show that all entries of M−1 are non-negative, then we have w1 ≥ ŵ1, w2 ≥ ŵ2, and
q ≥ q̂ for all feasible (w1, w2, q).
From a > c and (a, b) ./ (c, d) we conclude a + b < c + d, so that we have a − c ≥ 1
and d − b ≥ 2. Since e = a − u, f = b + v with 0 < u ≤ a − c, 0 ≤ v < d − b we have
a− e ≥ 1, f − b ≥ 0, e− c ≥ 0, and d− f ≥ 1. Thus, the entries of the first two rows of M−1
are non-negative integers. For Q = 1 we have ad− bc = q̂ ≥ 1. From f = b+ v, e = a− u we
conclude af − eb = av + bu ≥ 0. The last inequality arises from
ed− cf =︸︷︷︸
Q=1
ad− bc− (af − eb)− 1 = a(d− f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
+ b(e− c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
− 1 ≥ 0.

Let us illustrate how Lemma 4.7 works by an example. For this purpose let the weighted game
χ be uniquely characterized by its cardinality vector n = (4, 8) and its matrix of shift-minimal
winning vectorsM =
(
4 3 2 1 0
0 1 4 6 8
)T
. An integer representation preserving types is given
by the weights w1 = 7, w2 = 3, and quota q = 24. Let us assume the that winning vectors
(3, 1), (0, 8) and the losing vector (1, 5) would correspond to tight inequalities. The solution
of the corresponding equation system is given by w1 = 72 , w2 =
3
2 , q = 12. Here the weights
w1 and w2 are non-integer. So Lemma 4.7 says that (q, w1, w2) cannot be a feasible solution
of inequality system (9). Thus there must be a constraint which is violated. The construction
of (e′, f ′) in the proof precisely gives such a violation. Since 1 · (d − b) − 2 · (a − c) = 1
the coalition (2, 3) is a losing vector with weight 11.5. We can easily check that it is indeed a
shift-maximal losing vector having a weight strictly larger than q − 1 = 11.
Starting from the infeasible vector (12, 3.5, 1.5) the proof provides us even another candidate
for a 3-element subset of tight inequalities. If we replace the losing vector (1, 5) by (e′, f ′) =
(2, 3), then we obtain the solution w1 = 7, w2 = 3, q = 24, which now consists of integers.
Here we have
M =
 3 1 −10 8 −1
−2 −3 1
 and M−1 =
 5 2 72 1 3
16 7 24
 .
Since the inverse matrix M−1 consists of non-negative entries, as generally shown in the proof,
we have w′1 ≥ 7, w′2 ≥ 3, and q′ ≥ 24 for every averaged integer representation (q′, w′1, w′2).
To be more precise: if we combine the inequalities 3w1 + w2 − q ≥ 0, 8w2 − q ≥ 0, and
−2w1−3w2+ q ≥ 1 with non-negative multipliers given by the first row on M−1, we conclude
w1 ≥ 7. For the second and third row we similarly obtain w2 ≥ 3 and q ≥ 24, respectively.
Thus we have found a minimum sum integer representation preserving types.
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Lemma 4.8. For Inequality system (9), one tight inequality of type m˜Tw ≥ q and two tight
inequalities of type l˜Tw ≤ q − 1 lead to an integer solution (ŵ1, ŵ2, q̂) such that w1 ≥ ŵ1,
w2 ≥ ŵ2, and q ≥ q̂ for all feasible (w1, w2, q) or do not determine a solution at all.
PROOF. Let (a, b) ∈ Wsm and (c, d), (e, f) ∈ LsM be the vectors corresponding to the tight
inequalities, where we assume e > c. Solving the corresponding equation system yields ŵ1 =
d−f
Q , ŵ2 =
e−c
Q , and q̂ =
ad−fa+eb−bc
Q , where Q := fc − fa + ad − bc − ed + eb ∈ Z. The
case Q = 0 corresponds to an equation system which does not have a unique solution. Since
we know that each feasible solution of (9) satisfies w1, w2 > 0 we can assume Q > 0 in the
following.
Let g := gcd(e − c, d − f) ≥ 1. The vector (a′, b′) =
(
e− e−cg , c+ d−fg
)
has the same
weight as (a, b). So similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.7 we conclude that (a′, b′) is a shift-
minimal winning vector, which corresponds to a tight inequality. We again check that replacing
(a, b) by (a′, b′) is compatible with Q′ > 0 so that we can finally assume g = 1 w.l.o.g.
Now we apply Lemma 3.1 and choose unique integers u, v fulfilling u(d−f)−v(e− c) = 1,
where 0 < u ≤ e− c and 0 ≤ v < d− f . The coalition type (a′, b′) = (c+u, d− v) has weight
q − 1 + 1Q . Since losing vectors have a weight of at most q − 1 the vector is winning and we
have Q = 1. Using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 4.7 we conclude that (a′, b′) is
indeed a shift-minimal winning vector corresponding to a tight inequality. We can easily check
Q′ = fc − fa′ + a′d − b′c − ed + eb′ = 1 so that we can assume (a, b) = (a′, b′) since this
characterizes the same solution.
Let us have a closer look at the corresponding inequality system again:
aw1 + bw2 − q ≥ 0, −cw1 − dw2 + q ≥ 1, and − ew1 − fw2 + q ≥ 1.
For the basis (w1, w2, q) the inverse matrix is given by
M−1 =
1
Q
·
 d− f b− f d− be− c e− a a− c
ed− cf eb− af ad− bc
 .
If we can show that all entries of M−1 are non-negative, then we have w1 ≥ ŵ1, w2 ≥ ŵ2, and
q ≥ q̂ for all feasible (w1, w2, q).
From e > c and (c, d) ./ (e, f) we conclude e + f < c + d, so that we have e − c ≥ 1
and d − f ≥ 2. Since a = c + u, b = d − v with 0 < u ≤ e − c, 0 ≤ v < d − f we have
a − c ≥ 1, d − b ≥ 0, e − a ≥ 0, and b − f ≥ 1. Thus, the entries of the first two rows of
M−1 are non-negative integers. From e > c we conclude ed − cf ≥ c(d − f) ≥ 0 and from
a = c+ u, b = d− v we conclude ad− bc = ud+ vc ≥ 1. The last inequality arises from
eb− af =︸︷︷︸
Q=1
1 + (ed− cf)− (ad− bc) = 1 + d(e− a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ c(b− f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
≥ 1.

Theorem 4.9. Let χ be a weighted game without null voters and with t = 2, r > 1. Minimizing
the target function c1w1 + c2w2 + c3q, where c1, c2, c3 ≥ 0 and c1 + c2 + c3 > 0, subject to
the constraints in (9) results in a unique optimal integer solution (q, w1, w2) ∈ N3>0 satisfying
1 ≤ w1 ≤ n2, 1 ≤ w2 ≤ n1, and w2 + 1 ≤ q ≤ 2n1n2.
PROOF. Let (q, w1, q2) be the minimum value of n1w1 + n2w2 subject to the constraints in
(9). We already know that the optimum exists. This minimum is attained at a corner of the
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corresponding feasible set and thus arises as the unique solution of a 3 × 3-equation system,
consisting of three tight inequalities. Due to Lemma 4.6 we can apply either Lemma 4.7 or
Lemma 4.8. Thus, each feasible solution (q′, w′1, w′2) of inequality system (9) has to satisfy
q′ ≥ q, w′1 ≥ w1, and w′2 ≥ w2. So we have c1w′1 + c2w′2 + c3q′ ≥ c1w1 + c2w2 + c3q, where
equality is attained if and only if (q′, w′1, w′2) = (q, w1, w2). The formulas for w1, w2 and q in
Lemma 4.7 and Lemma 4.8 give the upper bounds w1 ≤ n2, w2 ≤ n1, and q ≤ 2n1n2. Since χ
does not contain null voters we also have w1, w2 ≥ 1. If q ≤ w2, then every single voter would
form a winning coalition, so that we only have one equivalence class, which contradicts t = 2.

To prove Theorem 4.1, we show that the unique optimal integer solution (q, w1, w2) from
Theorem 4.9 is indeed a minimum integer representation. To this end we state that for two
feasible solutions (q, w) and (q′, w′) of Inequality system (4) the vector λ·(q, w)+(1−λ)·(q′, w′)
is also a feasible solution for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 4.10. Given a weighted game χ without null voters and with t = 2, r > 1, let
(q̂, ŵ1, ŵ2) ∈ N3>0 be a feasible solution of (9), which minimizes the sum of weights n1ŵ1 +
n2ŵ2. For each integer representation (q, a1, . . . , an1 , b1, . . . bn2) of χ we have ai ≥ ŵ1 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n1 and bj ≥ ŵ2 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n2.
PROOF. It suffices to conclude a contradiction both from an1 ≤ ŵ1 − 1 and bn2 ≤ ŵ2 − 1.
To shorten the presentation we deal with the first case only. Since 1n1 ·
∑n1
i=1 ai ≥ ŵ1 we can
assume n1 ≥ 2 and since every convex combination of a feasible weighting is feasible we can
assume an1 = ŵ1 − 1 w.l.o.g. Next we set a :=
∑n1−1
i=1 ai
n1−1 and b :=
∑n2
i=1 bi
n2
. With this the vector
(q, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1−1
, ŵ1 − 1, b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
n2
)
is also a feasible solution of (4), where we have a ≥ ŵ1 + 1n1−1 > ŵ1.
Next we want to utilize the concept of tight inequalities to use a formula between the param-
eters of the tight inequalities and ŵ1. Due to Lemma 4.6 we have to distinguish the cases of
Lemma 4.7 and Lemma 4.8 only.
If there are two tight inequalities of type m˜Tw ≥ q for (q̂, ŵ1, ŵ2), see Lemma 4.7, then let
(c1, d1), (c2, d2) be the two corresponding winning vectors satisfying c1 > c2 and d1 < d2. Due
to Lemma 4.7 we have ŵ1 = d2 − d1. Next we choose two non-negative integers u ≤ c1 − c2
and v ≤ d2 − d1 such that u · (d2 − d1) − v(c1 − c2) = 1. We remark u ≥ 1. With this
(c3, d3) := (c1−u, d1+ v) is a losing vector corresponding to a tight inequality. Since (c1, d1),
(c2, d2) are winning, (c3, d3) is losing, c1 ≥ 1, c2 < n1, and c3 < n1 we have
(c1−1) ·a+1 · (ŵ1−1)+d1 ·b−q ≥ 0, c2 ·a+d2 ·b−q ≥ 0, and −c3 ·a−d3 ·b+q ≥ 1.
Summing up d2 − d3 times the first, d3 − d1 times the second, and d2 − d1 times the third
inequality yields
(1− d2 + d3︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
) a︸︷︷︸
>ŵ1
+ (d2 − d3︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)ŵ1 − (d2 − d3︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
) ≥ d2 − d1,
from which we conclude the contradiction
ŵ1 > d2 − d1 = ŵ1.
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If there are two tight inequalities of type m˜Tw ≤ q−1 for (q̂, ŵ1, ŵ2), see Lemma 4.8, then let
(c1, d1), (c2, d2) be the two corresponding losing vectors satisfying c1 < c2 and d1 > d2. Due
to Lemma 4.8 we have ŵ1 = d2 − d1. Next we choose two non-negative integers u ≤ c2 − c1
and v ≤ d1 − d2 such that u · (d1 − d2) − v(c2 − c1) = 1. We remark u ≥ 1. With this
(c3, d3) := (c1 + u, d1 − v) is a winning vector corresponding to a tight inequality. Thus we
have
(c3−1)·a+1·(ŵ1−1)+d3·b−q ≥ 0, −c1·a−d1·b+q ≥ 1, and −(c2−1)·a−1·(ŵ1−1)−d2·b+q ≥ 1.
Summing up d1 − d2 times the first, d3 − d2 times the second, and d1 − d3 times the third
inequality yields the contradiction ŵ1 > ŵ1.
Thus the assumption an1 ≤ ŵ1 − 1 cannot be true and we have ai ≥ ŵ1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n1.
Similar arguments can be outlined for bj ≥ w˜2 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n2. 
Remark 4.11. Due to the above lemmas we can algorithmically determine a minimum integer
representation in O
(
|Wsm|3 log(n) log log(n) + |Wsm|2 log2(n) log log(n)
)
time. The case
|Wsm| = r = 1 can be dealt directly using Lemma 4.2. For r ≥ 2 we consider all pairs
of shift-minimal winning vectors and all pairs of shift-maximal losing vectors. Here we have∣∣LsM ∣∣ ≤ |Wsm|+1 and |Wsm| ≤ min (n1 + 1, ⌊n2+22 ⌋) ≤ ⌊n+33 ⌋ due to Inequality system (2).
For each, inWsm×Wsm or LsM×LsM we calculate the parameters u and v via the Euclidean
algorithm to determine the third tight vector, see Lemma 4.7 and Lemma 4.8, respectively. So
we have to consider at most |Wsm|2 + ∣∣LsM ∣∣2 cases. In each case the Euclidean algorithm
performs at most log(n) steps where numbers between −n and n are added and divided. After
solving the 3 × 3-equation system, which can be done in time O(log(n) log log(n)), we only
have to check if the solution is feasible. Checking the feasibility means determining the minimal
weight of a winning vector and the maximal weight of a losing vector, which can be done using
O(|Wsm|) multiplications and additions.
Since the minimal possible values ofw1,w2, and q can be bounded viaw1 ≤ max(n1+1, n2),
w2 ≤ max(n1, n2 − 1), and q ≤ (n1 + n2) ·max(n1 + 1, n2) we may also determine a mini-
mum integer representation by trying out all possibilities, which results in a pseudo-polynomial
algorithm.
Due to the famous LLL-algorithm [21, 22] integer linear programs with a fixed number of
dimensions, i.e. the number of variables, and a fixed number of constraints can be solved in
polynomial time. For a two variables integer program defined by m constraints involving coef-
ficients with at most s bits there is a O(m+ logm log s)M(s) algorithm [6], where M(s) is the
time needed for s-bit integer multiplication (we assume M(s) = s log s log log s). For t = 2
types of voters we have
∣∣LsM ∣∣ , |Wsm| ≤ ⌊n+63 ⌋, so that m = |Wsm| · ∣∣LsM ∣∣ + n ∈ O(n2),
and s ∈ O(log n) using the ILP formulation without the quota q. For a general but fixed num-
ber of variables Clarkson’s sampling algorithm needs an expected number of O(m + s logm)
arithmetic operations [5]. Using the ILP formulation with an extra variable for the quota q we
have m = |Wsm| + ∣∣LsM ∣∣ + n ∈ O(nt−1) and s ∈ O(log n) for t types of voters. We would
like to remark that the number of minimal winning vectors can be exponential in n whenever the
number t of types of voters is not restricted; see e.g. [18].
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5. ENUMERATIONS AND BOUNDS FOR THE NUMBER OF WEIGHTED GAMES
Besides studying properties of complete simple games and weighted games one can also enu-
merate these special classes of cooperative games for small numbers of players n. In some cases
enumeration results provide a deeper understanding. So far the number of complete simple
games of weighted games is only known up to n = 9; see e.g. [10, 20]. Additionally restricting
the parameters t (the number of types of voters) and/or r (the number of shift-minimal win-
ning vectors) opens the possibility to determine enumeration formulas in some cases. A widely
known result in this context is csg(n, 1) = wvg(n, 1) = n, where csg(n, t) denotes the num-
ber of complete simple games with n voters partitioned into t equivalence classes. Similarly
wvg(n, t) denotes the number of weighted games with n voters occurring in t different types. In
[12] the authors have determined the formula cs(n, 2) = Fib(n + 6) − (n2 + 4n + 8), where
Fib(n) denotes the n-th Fibonacci number; see also [20] for an alternative proof. So we know
that cs(n, t) is at least exponential in n for t ≥ 2. In this section we want to show that the
situation changes for weighted games by proving a polynomial upper bound on wm(n, t) in
Theorem 5.2 and Theorem 5.3. It remains to come up with an exact formula for wm(n, 2).
If we refine our counts to the numbers csg(n, t, r) and wvg(n, t, r) by additionally consid-
ering the number r of shift-minimal winning vectors, more results can be obtained. In [20] an
algorithm is given to principally determine an exact formula for csg(n, t, r) whenever t and r
are fixed. So far it is not known whether this can also be done for the number wvg(n, t, r) of
weighted games with t types of voters and r shift-minimal winning vectors. For r = 1 it is
not too difficult to come up with such enumeration formulas as we will demonstrate for t = 2.
Having an exact characterization of the weighted games with t = 2 and r = 1 at hand, see the
proof of Theorem 4.2, we can easily determine a formula for their number:
Corollary 5.1. The number wm(n, 2, 1) of weighted games with t = 2 and r = 1 is given by
n− 1 for n ≤ 2 and 2(n− 2)2 + 2 for n ≥ 3.
If we skip the parameter r then we can only state an upper bound:
Theorem 5.2. wm(n, 2) ≤ n515 + 4n4.
PROOF. Due to the bounds in the minimum integer representation for r ≥ 2 in Theorem 4.1 and
Corollary 5.1 the number wm(n, 2) of weighted games with n voters and two types of voters is
upper bounded by
2(n−2)2+2+
n−1∑
n1=1
n−n1∑
w1=1
n1∑
w2=0
2n1(n−n1)∑
q=1
1 = 2(n−2)2+2+2
n−1∑
n1=1
(n−n1)2(n1+1)n1 ≤ n
5
15
+4n4.

For an arbitrary number t of types of voters we can determine the following polynomial upper
bound:
Theorem 5.3.
wm(n, t) < (tn)t
3+2t2 .
PROOF. Let us denote the weight vector by w, the shift-minimal winning vectors by m˜i, and
the shift-maximal losing vectors by l˜j . A complete simple game described by the m˜i or the l˜j is
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weighted if and only if the system of inequalities(
m˜i − l˜j
)
wT > 0 (10)
has a non-negative solution w (for all i, j).
Since λw is also a solution for all λ > 0 whenever w is a solution, we consider the equivalent
system (
m˜i − l˜j
)
wT ≥ 1. (11)
Such a system of linear inequalities corresponds to a polytope whose vertices correspond to n-
element subsets of the constraints which are attained with equality. Using the fact that the coeffi-
cients of this system of linear inequalities are integers between−(n−1) and n−1 we can apply
Cramers rule to conclude that vertices of this polytope can be written as vi =
(
w1 . . . wt
)
=(
a2,i
b2,i
. . .
at,i
bt,i
)
, where 0 ≤ aj,i ≤ (t− 1)!(n− 1)t and 1 ≤ bj,i ≤ (t− 1)!(n− 1)t. Here the
common denominator g is bounded from above by
(
(t− 1)!(n− 1)t
)t
.
Thus multiplying vertex vi with g yields integer weights w˜i between 0 and
(
(t − 1)!(n −
1)t
)t+1
. There are at most (tn)t
3+t2 possible tuples of integer weights to be considered. The
quota can be chosen as the minimum weight of a winning coalition. Since there are less than nt
possibilities for the numbers ni of voters in the t equivalence classes, the proposed upper bound
on wm(n, t) follows. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main result of this paper is that weighted games with two types of players admit a minimum
integer representation. For three types of players this need not to be the case. We have shown
that by providing examples of games without a minimum integer representation.
We found examples of weighted games with four types of voters without a minimum integer
representation preserving types. It is still an open problem to clarify whether all weighted games
with three types of voters admit a minimum integer representation preserving types. To adres
this lacuna we have tried to generalize our technique from Subsection 4.2. One may consider the
linear program minimizing the sum of the weights and have a closer look at the corners of the
corresponding polytope, which are characterized by four equations corresponding to four tight
types of coalitions (shift-maximal losing or shift-minimal winning vectors).
As demonstrated in Subsection 4.2 for three tight types of coalitions, the resulting weights
and the quota could be fractional. But using the extended Euclidean algorithm we were able to
construct another type of a coalition which contradicts the tightness of the starting three vectors
in these cases. For four tight types of coalitions (and the variables q, w1, w2, and w3) we may
go along the same lines and use the extended Euclidean algorithm for three integers in order to
deduce some restrictions on quadruples of tight types of coalitions. This indeed works, but there
still remain cases where the optimal LP solution is fractional. By generating random weighted
games with three types of voters we have discovered several such examples, some of them are
given below. For each example we state the sizes of the equivalence classes n = (n1, n2, n3),
the non-integer minimum sum representation preserving types τr = (q, w1, w2, w3), and the
minimum sum integer representation preserving types τi = (q, w1, w2, w3):
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(1) n = (9, 62, 71), τr = (154.3, 38.3, 22.6, 6.6), τi = (185, 46, 27, 8)
(2) n = (19, 52, 65), τr = (3984.2, 200, 110, 76.6), τi = (5617, 282, 155, 108)
(3) n = (30, 93, 30), τr = (122.3, 22.3, 16, 9.3), τi = (131, 24, 17, 10)
(4) n = (8, 99, 10), τr = (51, 17, 10.5, 4.5), τi = (57, 19, 12, 5)
(5) n = (3, 71, 37), τr = (347.5, 100, 31.5, 15), τi = (441, 127, 40, 19)
Originally we have obtained the values of τi by minimizing n1w1 + n2w2 + n3w3 but it turned
out that in all of these (and the other found) cases we have a minimum integer representation
preserving types, so that minimizingw1,w2,w3, or q would yield the same result. We would like
to remark that we have also found some example where only one value is non-integer. Although
in our experiments the only occurring denominators were 2, 3, and 5, we do not think that the
denominators are bounded by a constant. So far we have a very poor probabilistic model which
generates those examples with a very low probability. Nevertheless we have a strong feeling
that each weighted game with three types of voters admits a minimum integer representation
preserving types. As a small justification we would like to remark that we have tried some
specific parametric constructions which provably do not contain counter examples.
We leave the challenging question of whether each weighted games with three types of voters
admits an minimum integer representation preserving types open for the interested reader and
hope that our specific examples might help to get some useful insights. One can get a first
glimpse of the difficulty of this problem by comparing the values of τr and τi in our examples.
Weighted games with an arbitrary number of minimum sum integer representations have been
generated in Subsection 3.2. Moreover, some bounds have been obtained for the number of non-
isomorphic weighted games depending on the number of voters and on the number of types of
voters, and the existence of a weighted game, in minimum integer representation for any pair of
two coprime integer weights, has been determined.
Other interesting open problems in the context of this paper are the question for a weighted
game with a unique minimum sum integer representation, but without a minimum integer repre-
sentation, and the question for a polynomial time algorithm to determine minimum sum integer
representations for weighted games or a proof that this problem is NP -hard.
Another important line of research would be to deepen our understanding of the link between
minimum integer representations of weighted games and one-point solution concepts, like the
nucleolus, least core, etc.; see e.g. [18, 26].
Of course the techniques presented in this paper may be applied to study similar questions for
roughly weighted games.
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